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i
At present it is almost meaningless to discuss religion in the context 
of religion alone. Many people have no interest in religion, and gaining 
in strength are standpoints that negate religion not simply on the basis 
of personal feelings but philosophically in terms of basic principles. 
Given the presence of various ^religious and aziftreligious standpoints, 
to discuss religion as something axiomatic is to talk idly in ignorance of 
the present historical situation and, contrary to what one might expect, 
to lose sight of the very raison d’etre of religion. From time to time 
thinkers have raised the issue of the nature of religion, of its essence 
and raison d’etre. Philosophy of religion in the modern West has been 
concerned primarily with addressing this issue. Never has the need to in­
vestigate the essence of religion been so urgent, for never before have 
people so lost sight of the essence of humanity and fallen so deeply into 
alienation and disunity.
The publication of Nishitani Keiji’s What is Religion? is highly 
significant in this situation. As Nishitani writes in the Preface, his orien­
tation throughout the book is “the quest ... for the ‘ground’ of 
religion, where religion emerges from the human, as a subject, as a self 
living in the present.”1 He engages in this pursuit on the basis of a 
penetrating analysis of the existential situation of modern humanity.
*This is a shortened version of a review of Nishitani’s ShQkyO to wa nanika (What is 
Religion?). It was first published in Japanese in Tetsugaku KenkyQ (Philosophical 
Studies), #483, 1962, shortly after the appearance of Nishitani’s work. The translation 
was done by Christopher A. Ives.
1 Nishitani Keiji, Religion and Nothingness, tr. by Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: Univer­
sity of California Press, 1982), p. xlviii. Henceforth, all page numbers refer to this 
translation, portions of which have been adapted.
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In this essay I examine the sense in which Nishitani’s book is epoch- 
making and the place it occupies in the history of thought. I also set 
forth what I consider its fundamental standpoint and several doubts 
concerning points that challenge my comprehension.
II
Writing What is Religion? in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
Nishitani had aims similar to those of Schleiermacher when he wrote 
Uber die Religion at the end of the nineteenth century. For the benefit 
of the “cultured despisers” of religion, Schleiermacher sets forth the 
basis of religion and clarifies the unique truth of religion, which 
diverges from that of metaphysics or morality. He argues that “to be 
religious is to intuit the Universe,” and that it is only in religion that we 
make contact with the infinite, with the deepest reality of the universe. 
In this way he conceives of religion as a “higher realism.” Given 
Nishitani’s attempt to grasp religion from the perspective of a “real 
self-realization of reality,” his book demonstrates an affinity to Uber 
die Religion.
Nevertheless, Nishitani’s standpoint and the situation he confronts 
differ greatly from the standpoint and situation of Schleiermacher. 
From within the Western European Christian tradition Schleiermacher 
attempts to clarify the essence of religion in response to the Enlighten­
ment climate of the time, to the trend of idealizing that which is 
realistic and individual and reconstituting it as something universal. 
Confronting the problematic state of the contemporary “world,” 
Nishitani attempts to clarify the essence of religion for modern 
cultured people. These people, baptized in the waters of scientific 
thought, Marxism, and nihilism, do not so much “despise” religion as 
stand totally indifferent to it or perhaps even negate it. Accordingly, 
faced not with Enlightenment trends but with the mechanical perspec­
tive of modern science and the atheistic standpoint of nihilism, 
Nishitani confronts them head-on and thereby seeks “the ‘ground’ of 
religion, where religion emerges from the human.” (p. xlviii) “Reali­
ty” as that ground is conceived of as “emptiness” (^Qnyata). In the 
Preface, Nishitani writes,
The inquiry into religion attempted here proceeds by way of 
problems judged to lie hidden at the ground of the historical 
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frontier we call “the modem world,” with the aim of delving 
into the ground of human existence and, at the same time, 
searching anew for the wellsprings of reality itself. In so do* 
ing, I place myself squarely in a no-man’s-land straddling the 
realms of the religious and the anrtreligious, or tzreligious ... in 
a realm whose borders shift unevenly, (p. xlviii)
With this aim Nishitani articulates how the Asian standpoint of “emp­
tiness” is the standpoint of true reality to which modem humans must 
turn, and in this respect it can be deemed epoch-making.
The second sense in which Nishitani’s work is epoch-making con­
cerns Heidegger. Insofar as Nishitani writes that “the inquiry into 
religion attempted here proceeds by way of problems judged to lie hid­
den at the ground of the historical frontier we call ‘the modem world/ 
with the aim of delving into the ground of human existence and, at the 
same time, searching anew for the wellsprings of reality itself” (p. 
xlviii), the book inevitably confronts Heidegger’s philosophy. Here 
and there Nishitani touches upon Heidegger’s thought, but he does not 
offer a direct critique of Heidegger. Of course, this docs not indicate 
that Nishitani is indifferent to him or that he agrees with his philosophy 
just as it is. Quite to the contrary. In a certain respect one can regard 
Nishitani*s book as engaging in an out-and-out confrontation with 
Heidegger and going at least one step beyond his standpoint.
If one were to look in Heidegger’s thought for the closest equivalent 
of ka (^Unyata or “emptiness”), one would probably discover Seiki; 
the comparable term to shbki (“the emergence of a thing into its 
nature”) is Ereignis\ and the parallel concept to egoteki sOnya (“cir- 
cuminsessional interpenetration”) is Zusammengehoren. Heidegger 
sets forth his notion of Ereignis as that which gives an inner reality to 
the “same [thing]” (dasselbe, das Selbe) in Parmenides* proposition, 
“Being and thought are the same [thing].” To Heidegger, being and 
thought fundamentally ereignen or emerge together; they do not exist 
independently of each other but, breaking beyond all designations of 
metaphysics, are ecstatically and mutually yielding (iibereignen) and in 
their original being (Wesen) are self-presenting (anwesen). It is here 
that Being and thought have their interdependence (Zusammenge- 
horigkeit).
To Heidegger, a leap (Sprung) is necessary in the return of Being and 
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thought to Ereignis as their interpenetration (Zusammengehdren). 
Heidegger views Ereignis as “the domain which revolves within itself” 
(der in sich schwingende Bereich) and argues that it is from here that Be­
ing first appears as Being and thought first appears as thought. In 
Ereignis, Being and thought possess their respective Wesen, emerge 
together, and mutually yield (iibereignen) and interpenetrate (Zusam­
mengehdren). This is similar to Nishitani’s construing the circuminses- 
sional relationship between things as being possible only in the stand­
point of emptiness and as being the emergence of a thing into its nature 
in the field (ba) of emptiness, the standpoint indicated in Nishitani’s 
statement that “each thing in its being enters into the ground of every 
other thing, is not itself and yet precisely as such (namely, as located on 
the field of §0nyata) never ceases to be itself.” (p. 150) Moreover, in 
Heidegger, Ereignis is understood as the Ereignis of itself. Accord­
ingly, the Sein that Heidegger takes as fundamental is absolutely unob- 
jectifiable, and in that sense it is a Sein that contains negation and 
nothingness. However, it does not have the nature of qua /non (is/not; 
sokuhi) of “being-gwa-nothingness, nothingness-qua-being” (“being- 
s/ve-nothingness, nothingness-s/ve-being”).
In contrast to Heidegger, Nishitani’s standpoint of emptiness thor­
oughly possesses the character of qua/non. This is the standpoint of 
true Emptiness, in which even “emptiness” is emptied. For this reason, 
“the field of ecstatic transcendence of the subject,” just as it is, is 
turned “to the standpoint of ^Qnyata as the absolute near side where 
emptiness is self.” (p. 151) Here each and every thing manifests itself 
just as it is (i.e., manifests itself truly while being a provisional manifes­
tation), and knowledge is considered “phantom-like,” (p. 160) in that 
“the reflective knowledge whereby the self knows itself and objects is 
also made possible by the fact that the self in itself is a not-knowing.” 
(p. 156) In other words, the standpoint of emptiness, which establishes 
all “Being” as “Being” from its bottomless depths, is the standpoint of 
“suchness insight,” in which we know all things such as they are. “To 
know things such as they are is to restore things to their own ground.” 
(p. 162)
In this way, Nishitani’s standpoint of emptiness identifies “Being” 
and “knowing” in terms of qua/non (sokuhi), and regards that identi­
ty as the “True Self,” which is the absolute near side. This standpoint 
of emptiness goes a large step beyond Heidegger’s standpoint, which, 
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though resting on Sein, lacks the character of qua/non.
A third point is that Nishitani’s standpoint of emptiness does not ap­
pear out of nowhere, for it is part of the tradition of the philosophy 
of Absolute Nothingness initiated by Nishida and Tanabe. In fact, 
Nishitani occasionally uses the expression “Absolute Nothingness.” 
However, he espouses his own perspective as the standpoint of “emp­
tiness,” rather than relying on the expression, “Absolute Nothing­
ness.” Why does Nishitani draw a line of demarcation between himself 
and Nishida and Tanabe? Although this issue is beyond the scope of 
this essay, one factor can be mentioned here. As the inescapable 
problems of subjective nihility, Nishitani investigates the problem of the 
nihility opened up in humans by science and the problem of nihilism 
since Nietzsche. And it is as the complete overcoming of the standpoint 
of nihility that Nishitani formulates the standpoint of “emptiness.” 
Although Nishida and Tanabe took the problem of science seriously, 
for them it was as a problem of cognition or logic, not of nihility. 
Because of its mechanical world view, Nishitani treats science as a 
problem connected profoundly with views of God, that is, as the prob­
lem of atheism that opens up nihility at the base of God. Further, 
Nishitani thoroughly investigates the problem of “nihility” in con­
junction with Nietzsche’s positive nihilism and the atheistic stand­
point “subjectivized” by Sartre and others. This is not the case with 
Nishida and Tanabe, and this is why, while belonging to the school of 
the philosophy of Absolute Nothingness, Nishitani diverges from the 
philosophy preceding him and grants his standpoint a certain uni­
queness and originality.
Ill
Nishitani’s book also bears epoch-making significance in the area of 
philosophy of religion. Nishitani writes, “Insofar as religion is being 
treated as a whole, I do not intend to base myself on the tenets or doc­
trines of any religion in particular.” (p. xlviii) Given that he thus in­
vestigates religion as religion, his writing “may be said to follow the 
lead of previous philosophies of religion.” (p. xlix) To Nishitani, 
however, all philosophies of religion until now “have based themselves 
on something ‘immanent* in the human such as reason or intuition or 
feeling.” (p. xlix) But, “it has . . . become impossible to institute such 
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a standpoint, given the nature of the questions that have . . . given rise 
to the thought of the later Schelling, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, or 
even Feuerbach or Marx, and, above all, because of the appearance of 
positions like the nihilism of Nietzsche.” (p. xlix) With this historical 
backdrop, the considerations in the book “take their stand at the point 
where traditional philosophies of religion have broken down or been 
broken through.” (p. xlix)
Modern Western philosophies of religion strive to formulate rational­
ly the universal “essence” common to various religious traditions. 
Operative here is the creative intention to free religions from their in­
sular doctrines and specific historical character and to grasp them in 
the context of universal human religiosity. After Hegel—as the apex of 
such philosophy of religion—the abstractness and ideality of such 
philosophy of religion, as well as doubts about the metaphysics behind 
this freeing of religions from specificity, led to a decline in such 
philosophy of religion and to a split into two strands: first, the general 
study of religion and the study of the history of religions, which engage 
in comparative study of existing religions from the outside & la 
positivism; and second, theologies that hole up in particular religions 
and emphasize the uniqueness of the religions.
The positivistic and historical study of the various existing religious 
traditions and engrossment in the particularity of specific religions tend 
either to fix the eyes only on the past or to foster a closed-minded, in­
tolerant attitude toward other religions. At present, theology has 
become more flexible and open, and once again we need a philosophy 
of religion that investigates the universal essence of religion and 
unearths new possibilities for the present and future. Under the title 
What is Religion? Nishitani avoids taking an approach that “analyzes 
the range of phenomena that characterize the various historical 
religions and explains the universal traits of what we call religion” (p. 
xlvii); rather, he takes an approach in which
the fundamental meaning of religion—what religion is—is 
not to be conceived in terms of what it has been. Our reflec­
tions take place at the borderline where understanding of 
what has been constantly turns into an investigation of what 
ought to be; and, conversely, where the conception of what 
ought to be never ceases to be a clarification of what has been, 
(p. xlviii)
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As an existential being living in the modern age, Nishitani takes the 
creative attitude of looking from the present to the future.
In this inquiry Nishitani rejects imitation of eighteenth- and nine­
teenth-century philosophies of religion that seek the universal essence 
common to all religions. To him, the pervasive influence of the 
mechanistic world view based on modem science and the emergence of 
the active nihilism through which one endures nihility without God 
make it impossible to articulate the essence of religion in terms of 
anything “immanent” to humans, such as reason, intuition, or feeling.
Nishitani focuses on the place where the standpoint of traditional 
philosophies of religion has broken down and the “immanence” in 
human beings has been broken through. This place is “emptiness,” 
in which impersonal personality—or personal impersonality—is estab­
lished and the double-exposure of life and death truly becomes possible. 
Nishitani writes,
In the past most religions tended to be motivated solely by 
human interests, by the questions of the “human.” Their 
basis was, to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche, “human, all 
too human.” This comes as no surprise—religion has to do 
with human salvation. But being concerned with human salva­
tion is different from concluding that the enabling ground of 
salvation lies within the realm of human interests, (p. 49)
In this way he emphasizes breaking through the standpoint of 
self-consciousness, that is to say, of self-centeredness, personality- 
centeredness, and anthropocentricity. He goes beyond the standpoint 
in which things are seen as objects and represented by consciousness, 
the anthropocentric standpoint that excludes impersonal nature and 
inanimate materiality. He sets forth the standpoint of emptiness, in 
which “each and every thing presents itself in its own suchness.” (p. 
106) And he stresses that it is on the basis of such a standpoint of emp­
tiness that religion as “human salvation” truly comes into being.
Accordingly, Nishitani’s standpoint of emptiness breaks beyond not 
only the framework of past philosophies of religion, but also the 
frameworks of Christianity and Buddhism. For this reason, his stand­
point of “emptiness” is neither simply the Buddhist SOnyati explicated 
by Buddhologists nor simply a concept of Buddhism as a religion 
distinct from Christianity. As one who tries to “take a stand at one and 
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the same time within and without the confines of tradition” (p. xlix), 
Nishitani endeavors to set forth the standpoint of emptiness as the 
foundation of religion that ought to exist hereafter, and this endeavor 
encompasses the negative factor of the breakdown of the standpoint of 
past philosophies of religion and his positive conviction that world 
religions have the capability of developing anew.
But this does not mean that Nishitani is advocating some sort of new 
world religion. Rather, he is trying to realize—more than it has been 
realized by historical religions in the past—the fundamental religious 
life that is rooted in the very essence of human beings, to inquire into 
the universal “root source” of religion, which is not “religious” in the 
usual sense. This areligious ground of religion is none other than the 
standpoint of emptiness. Accordingly, to stand in the standpoint of 
emptiness is not merely to break beyond the frameworks of past phi­
losophies of religion, but to break beyond the frameworks of religions 
themselves.
In contrast with Bultmann’s advocacy of Entmythologisierung in 
an attempt to demythologize Christianity, Nishitani aims at Ent- 
religiosierung in an attempt to uncover the ground of religion and 
“dereligionize” religion. For Bultman, demythologizing is primarily a 
hermeneutical issue, whereas “dereligionizing” is not a hermeneutical 
issue but the subjective event of breaking through all self-centered 
standpoints and standing in the standpoint of emptiness. This is what 
Nishitani indicates in the Preface when he writes that “the quest is for 
the ‘ground’ of religion, where religion emerges from the human, as a 
subject, as a self living in the present.” (p. xlviii) This is the most impor­
tant sense in which the book is epoch-making.
IV
Nishitani’s book demands a conversion of one’s everyday way of being 
from a self-centered standpoint that asks, “What is the purpose of 
religion for me?” to a standpoint that asks, “For what purpose do I 
myself exist?” Only through the religious demand that emerges in the 
occasion of this conversion can one legitimately inquire into the es­
sence of religion, and Nishitani attempts to do so from the angle of “the 
self-realization of reality, or, more concretely, the real self-realization 
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of reality?* (p. 5) Accordingly, that which forms the keynote of the 
book is precisely this real self-realization of reality.
With the expression “real self-realization of reality,” Nishitani is im­
plying two things: “our realization of reality” and “the reality realiz­
ing itself in our realization?’ (p. 5) He uses the English term realization 
to express this, and also uses such terminology as “realization-^wa- 
appropriation” and “manifestation-^ua-apprehension.” This corre­
sponds to Heidegger’s grasp of Denken des Seins in the double sense 
of thinking about Being and Being itself thinking. Several points call 
for a word of caution here. First, Nishitani stresses that his “realiza­
tion” is not a theoretical cognition but a “real embodied-obtaining?’ 
an “appropriation.” Second, “the real perception of reality is our real 
mode of being itself.” (p. 6) In other words, our ability to perceive re­
ality is precisely reality’s realizing itself in us, and “the self-realization 
of reality can only take place by causing our existence to become truly 
real.” (p. 6) In what sort of place (ba) is the “real self-realization of 
reality” established? It is the place of emptiness, which is distinguished 
from the place of life, the place of consciousness, or the place of 
nihility.
It is impossible in a short essay to summarize all the problems 
Nishitani considers through his penetrating insight, so next I will sim­
ply discuss the three central problems constituting the book, each of 
which concerns the “real self-realization of reality.”
The first is the problem of the impersonal personality, or personal im­
personality, found in religion. The notion of impersonal personality ap­
pears clearly in Nishitani’s earlier work, The Philosophy of Fundamen­
tal Subjectivity* but in this present work Nishitani links it up with his 
critique of Christianity and his suggestions of new possibilities for the 
development of Christianity on the basis of the problems of the en­
counter between science and religion and especially of the modern 
atheism that has resulted from that encounter. In the premodern 
teleological view of nature, God and nature (inclusive of the human) 
were seen as existing in harmony. When modern science introduced the 
mechanistic view of nature, nature came to be conceptualized as
2 The original Japanese title is Kongenteki shutaisei no tetsugaku, published by 
KObundO, Tokyo, 1940. See p. 172 and p. 210.
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something beyond the framework of divine order and hence contradic­
tory to a personal God; and subjectivity, now broken beyond the 
framework of divine order, came to exist in the freedom of living in 
nihility. To transcend atheism as the result of modern science, Nishi­
tani perceived the need to reexamine the concept of “personality” as it 
pertains to God and humanity.
Nishitani argues that the Christian view of God includes two 
heterogeneous elements: the perfection of God who empties Himself 
and loves all things non-differentiatingly, and the personality of God 
who makes choices on the basis of absolute will. Nishitani argues that 
traditionally the latter aspect of God has been stressed while the former 
has commanded little attention, (pp. 58-60) He states that God’s 
perfection as the source of non-differentiating love transcends God’s 
so-called personal character and has a character of “impersonal per­
sonality,” and it is here that he discerns new possibilities for the de­
velopment of Christianity. At the same time, he argues that Eckhart’s 
notion of the “Nichts” (nothingness) of the Gottheit, arrived at by 
penetrating human subjective self-awareness and free autonomy to 
their limits and thereby realizing a trans-personal aspect to God, sug­
gests a way of overcoming modem nihilism. In the nothingness of 
Gottheit, the being of God and the being of the human are both ekstatic 
(self-extricating) and can subjectively become “one.”
For that impersonal personality to be established in the true sense, 
however, the direction from being to nothingness in that ekstasis 
must shift to the direction from nothingness to being. Needed here is 
the standpoint of the shift from absolute-affirmation-qua-negation to 
absolute-negation-qua-affirmation. (p. 68) This shift is recognized by 
Eckhart, who states that “God’s ground is my ground, and my ground 
is God’s ground.” That which opens up in the depths of this shift is the 
personality that is the “formless form” (the form of non-form), the 
personality that “is constituted at one with absolute nothingness as 
that in which absolute nothingness becomes manifest.” (p. 71) In other 
words, it is the person or personality that becomes manifest in the place 
of emptiness.
The second and perhaps most central problem Nishitani addresses is 
the standpoint of emptiness, which is distinguished from the stand­
point of nihility and transcends nihility. At the extreme point of the 
mechanization of the human through science, nihility is opened up at 
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the foundation of the human and the world, and this nihility is realized 
as something which “nihilizes” the foundation of God as well. The 
standpoint of modem nihilism comes forth in the contention that 
humans can be truly autonomous and free only by standing decisively 
in the abyss of nihility. Although nihility is subjectivized there, given 
the way the “abyss” of nihility is discussed, nihility is seen from the 
side of self as something appearing external to the selfs being. Remain­
ing here are the vestiges of the standpoints of representation and self- 
centeredness. In order to stand in a truly free and truly subjective stand­
point, one must take a step beyond such a standpoint of nihility and 
stand in a place that lies even closer to the side of the self than the 
seifs ordinary being does. This is the standpoint of emptiness as distin­
guished from nihility. Because “emptiness in the sense of SOnyati is 
emptiness only when it empties itself even of the standpoint that re­
presents it as some ‘thing’ that is emptiness,” (p. 96) emptiness is not 
seen as something outside of “being,” but rather is realized as identical 
with being, as forming a self-identity with it. Accordingly, “what we 
have called the abyss of nihility can only be constituted in emptiness.” 
(p. 98)
Nishitani*s articulation of the standpoint of emptiness transcendent 
of nihility reflects the intensity and depth of his experience and specula- 
tion—his own long years of engrossment in awareness of nihility and 
his breakthrough to the standpoint of emptiness. He designates the 
standpoint of emptiness as the place where the inseparability of life and 
death, being and nothingness, is established; as the place where per­
sonality as reality manifests itself just as it is; as “the place of absolute 
life-qua-death”; as “the absolutely transcendent this-side” that is iden­
tical with the absolutely transcendent other-side; as the “in itself’ 
(Jitai) distinguished from both substance (jittai) and subject (s/tutai): 
as the place in which all things dispersed and dismantled in nihility are 
once again restored to being; as the place of beification or Ichtun& as 
“the place of great affirmation”; as the “place of power” in which all 
things in their “being” are absolutely unique while arising together col­
lectively as a one. Further, the way of being of things in the place of 
emptiness is designated as “samadhi-being” in that all things exhibit 
an “in itself” way of being as if in samadhi; as “middle” in that each 
thing is true being precisely as provisional manifestation and provi­
sional manifestation precisely as true being; as “Position” in that all 
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things are self-establishing in their original position; as “circuminses- 
sionally interpenetrating” in that all things stand in a relationship in 
which they are simultaneously master and attendant to each other; and 
also as “thus-thus” (nyo-nyo), “phantom-like qua true-suchness” 
(nyogen soku nyojitsu), and “primal fact” (genponteki jijitsu). Space 
does not permit detailed consideration of these expressions, but suffice 
it to say that with Nishitani £unyat& is for the first time articulated ex­
istentially and philosophized in close connection—and confronta­
tion—with Western philosophical thought.
The third central problem of the book is the issue of the relationship 
between the standpoint of emptiness and historicity, the form historici­
ty has assumed in that standpoint, and the form it ought to assume. 
Given that thinkers before Nishitani almost never addressed the issue 
of the historicity of emptiness, the final two chapters of the book, 
“Sunyata and Time” and “Siinyata and History,” are quite valuable. 
Here Nishitani’s original speculation shines forth and his argumenta­
tion brims with power and vitality.
Nishitani begins his discussion of the problem of “time” with the 
argument that existence in the manner of “dropped off body-and- 
mind,” that is, existence as true emptiness, is existence as the fullness 
of true time. He then asks himself “whether the various basic views of 
history that have so far appeared in the West do, in fact, exhaust the 
possible standpoints for looking at history.” (p. 201) He directs his at­
tention to the Christian eschatological view of history, to the pro­
gressive view of history that appeared during the Enlightenment in 
response to the Christian view, and to the view of history set forth by 
Nietzsche, who rejects the first two views and advocates eternal recur­
rence in their stead. Nishitani clarifies that in the West “the problems 
of time and eternity, of the historical and the transhistorical, in the end 
always come to be combined with the concept of will” (p. 236), and 
divine will, human will, and the will to power are viewed as something 
called “will” that functions at the base of history. In this respect, these 
various wills, including Nietzsche’s, still carry a connotation of being 
“other” to us, and hence to Nishitani these Western views of history 
do not completely account for the historicity of that which is truly 
historical.
Nishitani acknowledges that history only comes into being in the 
standpoint of a self with a self-centered personality, i.e., in the stand­
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point of the will. He argues that the Buddhist concept of karma implies 
both the beginningless and endless time spoken of in modern 
secularism since the Enlightenment, and a character of liberated, in­
finite drive. And it is precisely the standpoint of emptiness that 
abolishes and converts the self-awareness of nihility opening up infinite­
ly at the ground of “karma from time past without beginning.” 
Nishitani stresses that it is in such a standpoint of emptiness that the 
historicity of that which is historical is first truly and fully realized, for 
that standpoint is the standpoint of bottomless existence, which is 
established in the bottomlessness transcending—through absolute nega­
tion—the standpoint of “will” that lies at the base of self-centeredness 
in its various forms, and it is also the standpoint of the complete con­
version to the true self, the self that is no self. For this reason, there is 
nothing in the trans-historical dimension represented as “something,” 
and time is disclosed bottomlessly as time and history is revealed bot- 
tomlessly as history in their original forms. Further, the self in the 
place of emptiness, the self that has died and gained new life with 
“time” as the place of conversion (metanoia or paravritti-vijnana), 
is an existence emerging from bottomlessness into its own nature; and 
as such its self-realization is the realization of the knowing of non­
knowing, and its function, as the action of non-action, is fundamen­
tally Ernst (seriousness) while simultaneously a fundamental disport- 
ment. Further, its Dasein is truly a non-duality of self and other, and it 
possesses compassion. It is along these lives that Nishitani argues that 
only in the standpoint of emptiness can the historicity of history be estab­
lished.
V
Reflecting on the above outline of the three main problems Nishitani 
considers in his book, I now offer several lingering doubts about 
Nishitani’s approach. My first doubt concerns the standpoint of imper­
sonal personality and the problem of sin. As mentioned above, “imper­
sonal personality” and “personal impersonality” manifest themselves 
as “the formless form” (the form of non-form) in the place of emp­
tiness. Therein the human as personality presents himself or herself 
identical with absolute nothingness as that in which absolute nothing­
ness becomes manifest. Recognizing the necessity of reexamining the 
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idea of personality, Nishitani sets forth his notion of personality as a 
new view based on the religion that “ought to be.” In this regard, he 
tends to emphasize the ideas of the perfection of God at the ground of 
the personal God’s love, for it has a character of impersonal personality 
and—in conjunction with an existential interpretation of God’s omni­
presence and omnipotence—it opens up an avenue for developing 
new Christian possibilities. This necessity for a rethinking of the idea 
of personality derives from the problem of overcoming the nihility real­
ized through modern science’s mechanistic view of nature, the nihility 
that extends to the field of God’s existence.
In Christianity, God’s “personality” links fundamentally with the 
problems of human sin as rebellion against the will of God and God’s 
love as the forgiveness of that sin. For this reason, to raise the issue of 
impersonal personality is to raise the problem of sin, as evidenced by 
Nishitani’s book (pp. 27-30, 44-5, 92). In Nishitani’s discussion, 
however, sin is grasped ultimately in terms of “nihility” together with 
the problem of doubt.
But if, as he himself argues, sin and doubt are “instances of nihility 
appearing in the form of a ‘spiritual’ self-awareness at the ground of 
the self-conscious ‘ego’,” (p. 29) they need to be grasped in their respec­
tive particularity as “nihility in sublimated form, come to light in an ex­
istence aware of itself.” (p. 92) That is to say, insofar as these factors 
are related to the issue of impersonal personality, the problem of sin 
(which in all respects concerns the will), must not be reduced along 
with the problem of doubt (which has an intellectual character) to the 
problem of nihility, but must be grasped in its own particularity. On 
the one hand, sin, like doubt, is rooted in human nihility; but on the 
other hand, it is the willful rebellion against the will of God. Given that 
Nishitani ultimately reduces sin to nihility and examines it as a problem 
of nihility, does he not omit the unique aspect of sin as rebellion 
against the divine will? Insofar as this is the case, the impersonal per­
sonality he arrives at may not be an “impersonal” personality in the 
true sense.
This relates to the fact that Nishitani barely considers Jesus Christ 
when he examines the perfection, omnipresence, and omnipotence of 
the Christian God. From the perspective of Christianity, these at­
tributes of God must be grasped christologically. Only through Christ 
on the cross does God first truly engage in self-revelation and does a 
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human know God. Only through Christ on the cross does there emerge 
awareness of truly real sin and of faith as the conversion from sin. Ac­
cordingly, to discuss the problem of God’s perfection and impersonal 
personality without any reference to Christ is to divorce that discussion 
from the problem of sin and faith.
God’s impersonal personality enters Nishitani’s discussion through a 
search for the reality of God transcendent of all types of nihility, that 
is, God as reality. To satisfy this search Nishitani sets forth Eckhart’s 
notion of the nothingness of the Gottheit as the deepest standpoint in 
Christianity. Most people would probably acknowledge that there ex­
ists in Eckhart’s thought a standpoint of God’s own ecstatic reality, 
but when that standpoint is articulated in connection with impersonal 
personality, certain problems arise.
Eckhart discovers God’s “essence” or Gottheit in the ground of the 
personal God. This nothingness of the Gottheit is the true, unobjec- 
tifiable reality of God. But at the same time, looked at from another 
direction, in Christ on the cross God became a more real God. In 
Christ’s death and resurrection, the reality of God broke through nihili­
ty, overcame it, and became a reality of a higher dimension. In short, 
the “personal” God in Christianity is understood as entailing two direc­
tions in opposition to each other: 1) God’s ecstatic self-transcendence 
in the direction of the nothingness of the Gottheit, and 2) God’s self­
revelation through self-negation in the direction of the more personal 
Jesus Christ. In terms of the human, the first direction is that of 
nothingness and autonomy, while the latter is that of sin and faith.
For God’s personal impersonality and impersonal personality to be 
truly and fully discussed, both of these directions in God’s “personali­
ty” must be examined simultaneously. And yet in Nishitani’s book, the 
latter direction—the direction toward Jesus Christ—has been exclud­
ed, for the impersonal personality of God has been sought only in the 
former direction of the nothingness of the Gottheit, For this reason 
one is left with doubts about whether Nishitani has returned in the true 
sense to the “ground” of personality.
In order to work out correctly and adequately the new concept of per­
sonality that Nishitani terms impersonal personality or personal imper­
sonality, the standpoint of emptiness must be set forth on the basis of 
thoroughgoing examination of not only the problem of doubt but also 
the problem of sin and faith. In other words, it is necessary to examine
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the problem of personality and articulate the standpoint of emptiness 
through examination not only of the problem of “nihility and emp­
tiness,” but also of the issues of “sin and emptiness” and “faith and
in a radical form by such modern thinkers as Kierkegaard and Barth). 
In this regard, the notion of “Karma” discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of 
Nishitani’s book can play an extremely important methodological role.
VI
My second doubt is about whether Nishitani has adequately 
distinguished nihilism as the result of science from Nietzsche’s positive 
nihilism. Nishitani contends that the field of emptiness is the place 
where the conversion or “turning around” of absolute death-<7na-fife 
is established; and this field is not found merely in the direction of life 
(the direction of personality), which is the core of religion, or merely in 
the direction of death (the direction of materiality), which is the core of 
the scientific perspective in its most thoroughgoing form, but opens up 
in the intersection of these two directions. That is to say, it is a place 
realized “directly underfoot of the proper Form of things as life-qua- 
death and death-qua-life.” (p. 94) Nishitani emphasizes that in both 
the direction of life and the direction of death the problematic situa­
tion is not simple; he points out that in the direction of life—which 
religion opts for—there is a leap through which sin as a high-order 
death is converted and one arrives at faith, and in the direction of 
death—where science stands—there is a leap in which one goes beyond 
nihility and meaninglessness and stands in nihilism realized in and 
through existence. Nishitani writes, “it seems to me that traditional 
religions spin on a life-oriented axis, while the line running from the 
scientific viewpoint to nihilism represents a death-oriented axis.” (p. 
93) Certain doubts arise in the present writer when Nishitani grasps 
science and nihilism together in the direction opposite to religion, when 
he grasps nihilism only as linked up with the viewpoint of science as the 
opposite of religion.
In his inquiry, Nishitani rightly points out that 1) the mechanistic 
view of nature that is based on science is not merely a problem of the 
world of science but at present a problem directly related to human ex­
istence and to views of God; 2) Sartre’s existentialist atheism attempts 
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to stand decisively in nihility realized—because of science—at the base 
of humans and the world; and 3) the standpoint of Nietzsche’s positive 
nihilism is likewise established in the encounter with modem science 
“after passing through the purgative fires of the mechanistic world 
view.” (p. 57) In this regard, it is proper to grasp nihilism, inclusive of 
Sartre and Nietzsche, in the direction of science opposite the direction 
of religion. Yet even granting this, should we not treat Sartre's existen­
tialist nihilism and Nietzsche’s positive nihilism as two views with an 
essential difference? Should we not point out that Nietzsche’s stand­
point, the standpoint of the Vbermensch who endures nihility without 
God and tries to break beyond God and nihility, is not merely passing 
through the purgative fires of science in the direction of science, but at 
the same time in one respect goes beyond God in the direction of 
religion?
Indeed, the nihility of the Ubermensch who overcomes both God 
and nihility is a nihility realized on God’s “far side,” a nihility opening 
up at the very base of the living God and realized on the far side of 
God through a break beyond God. This radical nihilism of Nietzsche 
is not found in Sartre’s nihilism, which declares that Existentialism is 
a form of humanism and creates an “image of man” (p. 32) in one’s 
decision to stand in nothingness. Accordingly, if modem existentialist 
nihilism represented by Sartre is correctly located as a leap in the direc­
tion of science, in the direction of death together with science, then 
Nietzsche’s positive nihilism must be located in a third standpoint 
beyond both the orientation linking up with science and the direction 
of religion.
Nishitani’s lumping together of Sartre and Nietzsche is also seen in 
his contrasting of them with the standpoint of emptiness as the ab­
solute other-side precisely because it is the absolute this-side, as “the 
point at which 0° means 360°.” (p. 106) Nishitani argues that the 
Platonic and Christian standpoints are constituted on the far side in a 
90° rotation toward the heavens, while the standpoint of nihilism as 
the abyss of nihility is constituted on the near side in a 90° rotation 
downward toward the underground region. In contrast to these two 
standpoints, the standpoint of emptiness “makes its appearance in 
a kind of 180° turn, as a field that simultaneously comprises both of 
the 90° turns of the formally opposing orientations upward to heaven 
and downward to under the earth.” (p. 105) Moreover, “when the 
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standpoint of emptiness is radicalized—and the corresponding orienta­
tion is one in which emptiness itself is also emptied—this is like a 360° 
turn” (pp. 105-106), and ultimately “it is the point at which 0° means 
360°.” (p. 106) Here, too, in a comparison with the standpoint of empti­
ness, Nietzsche’s standpoint of positive nihilism is grasped merely in 
the downward direction opposite to the direction of the Platonic realm 
of the Ideas and the Christian heaven.
The standpoint of Nietzsche’s positive nihilism does not come forth 
in a downward transcendence opposite to an upward transcendence. 
Rather, is it not the standpoint of the enduring of nihility in an ab­
solute life on earth, which transcends both directions? In terms of 
Nishitani’s directional schema, it is not a standpoint involving a 90° 
turn downward, but a standpoint that “makes its appearance in a kind 
of 180° turn, . . . [which] simultaneously comprises both of the 90° 
turns of the formally opposing orientations upward to heaven and 
downward to under the earth.” (p. 105) This is the aforementioned 
idea that Nietzsche’s positive nihilism should be located as a third 
standpoint which is neither the orientation toward life (religion) nor 
the orientation toward death (science and nihilism).
In Nietzsche’s positive nihilism, that is, in the standpoint of the 
Ubermensch who overcomes God and nihility, there is definitely an 
aspect of transcendence of both the direction of God-sin and the direc­
tion of science-nihility, but this is not yet the standpoint of true emp­
tiness. Nietzsche’s standpoint resides in the standpoint of a 180° turn 
which must be emptied and negatively transcended in order to reach 
the standpoint of true emptiness, the standpoint of a completed 360° 
turn. Insofar as Nietzsche’s “innocence of becoming”—even with an 
aspect that makes it similar to the standpoint of emptiness—is based on 
the “will to power,” when viewed from the standpoint of true emp­
tiness it is still a kind of “emptiness perversely clung to” and should be 
overcome.
Accordingly, with regard to the question of “nihility and emp­
tiness,” that is, in setting forth the standpoint of emptiness as the over­
coming of nihilism, the most important thing is not the confrontation 
between the standpoint of emptiness and the abyss of nihility that 
emerges in a 90° turn, but the confrontation between the standpoint of 
emptiness and the positive nihilism that emerges in a 180° turn. In one 
regard, Nishitani’s work does carry out such serious confrontation, 
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but in another regard, we discover a discordance in that Nietzsche’s 
positive nihilism is grasped with Sartre’s modern existentialist nihilism 
only with regard to science in a leap from the orientation upon which 
science rests. This is an area in which Nishitani’s overcoming of nihility 
and presentation of the standpoint of emptiness as the basis of that 
overcoming is less than complete.
Although I have discussed two doubts that arose in my reading of 
Nishitani’s book, several more remain. These doubts concern the prob­
lem of being and oughtness (Sollen) in the standpoint of emptiness and 
the issue of historicity in the standpoint of emptiness. Given the length 
constraints of this article, however, treatment of these doubts will have 
to wait for another opportunity.
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